Ami Ayalon: 'We Feel It Every Day'

Earlier this month the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot published a joint interview with four former directors of the Shin Bet, Israel's domestic intelligence service, that was notable for its sharp criticisms of the policies of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Warning that Israel's military tactics in the territories were only breeding further hatred and terror, the ex-chiefs called for an end to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and urged Israel to begin to negotiate unilaterally for a peace deal even before the Palestinians crack down on militant groups. Among the participants was Maj. Gen. Ami Ayalon, who headed the agency from 1996 until 2000 and is coauthor, with Sari Nusseibeh, of a peace plan that has been signed by tens of thousands of Israelis and Palestinians. Ayalon spoke with NEWSWEEK's Jerusalem Bureau Chief Joshua Hammer last week. Excerpts:

Why did you four decide to come forward now?

Each of us had been speaking out to his own small audience. But we concluded that each by himself is not loud enough, that the only way to get the attention of the press, the Israeli people and the international audience would be to sit together [and put out the message]. Soon Israel won't be a democracy or a state for the Jewish people. We have to change the direction [of our policies] before it's too late.

Are you in favor of abandoning such tactics as targeted killings, closure and the security fence?

We are not naive. We know that it is not only our right, it is our duty to fight terror using every effective tool. But let's look at the last three years. We lost 900 people. We killed thousands of Palestinians, and created humiliation and waves of future terror. We tried everything and we failed.

In the nine months before the intifada only one Israeli was killed as a result of terror. It did not happen because the Shin Bet was better. I was director of Shin Bet during most of that time, and I can tell you that Shin Bet today on an operational level is much better. Why did it happen? The main reason was the hope in the Palestinian Street.

Didn't the failed peace initiative known as the Roadmap offer that hope?

The Roadmap [fell victim] to the same idea of "constructive ambiguity" that led to the collapse of the 1993 Oslo accords. It said nothing about settlements, the right of return of Palestinian refugees or the borders [of the future Palestinian state]. The assumption was that the future is so painful, so sensitive, that if we shall touch it in the beginning, the whole building will collapse.

How does your proposal differ from the Geneva accord, the plan cosponsored by former Oslo negotiator Yossi Beilin and Palestinian cabinet minister Yasir Abed Raboo?

We share two ideas: first, that there is a partner on the other side, and second, that in order to move forward we have to have a specific plan about the future--two states, along 1967 borders, settlements in exchange for land. But [unlike Geneva] for us the right of return of Palestinian refugees is a red line that can't be crossed. Secondly, we're against giving sovereignty over the Temple Mount to the state of Palestine. They will be guardians of the mosque, we will be guardians of the Western Wall.

Don't most Israelis still accept the idea that the Palestinians must be defeated before peace talks can begin?

Israelis are confused. On the one hand, we feel pain. We suffer. We hate the Palestinians and we do not believe them. Most Israelis think that in order to bring them back to negotiate, we have to achieve victory in military terms. On the other hand, more and more Israelis understand that it doesn't work.

Can Prime Minister Sharon lead Israel to a viable two-state solution?

If we speak out [and Sharon hears us], I think he might be this leader. If he will not, then we shall have to replace him.

What about Yasir Arafat?

It's for the Palestinians to decide who will lead them. I can tell you that once we accept this, Arafat will be much less powerful. If you read the Palestinian press of 2000, before the outbreak of the intifada, most of it was against his corruption of the Palestinian Authority. Arafat's popularity was low. He became so popular only because we considered him irrelevant.

Isn't it ironic that four leaders of the war against terror should become such critics of it?

Shin Bet has been at the forefront of the battle. But in order to do it, we are the people who meet Palestinians. We see not only the terrorists, we also see where they come from. We see the correlation between poverty, despair, humiliation and terror. And we do not only fight the terror of today, we understand the root of the terror of tomorrow. We feel it, we touch it every day.