Biden Wants To Reform the U.N. Security Council. Can It Happen? | Opinion

Ask any country in Africa, Latin America, and Asia about the U.N. Security Council and you are liable to stumble upon a common theme: The U.N.'s most powerful body is unrepresentative and unfair to every state that doesn't have permanent membership.

The Biden administration has heard the cries. On June 12, The Washington Post reported that the White House is working on a proposal that could add six permanent seats to the Security Council, turning the current P5 (the U.S., U.K., China, Russia, and France) into the P11. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield is running point on the budding initiative, which comes about a year after President Joe Biden committed himself to reforming the Security Council in front of the U.N. General Assembly.

Biden's own initiative, which is still under development, is just the latest in a long list of attempts to rejigger the U.N. system to better reflect the current realities in international statecraft. Bill Clinton, for instance, supported giving Germany and Japan permanent Security Council seats. Former President George W. Bush, who wasn't particularly enthralled with the U.N. system in the first place, lobbied for Japan's inclusion. Former President Barack Obama endorsed the addition of India in 2010.

Senior U.N. officials have tried to kick-start the debate as well. It's not hard to see why. The last time the Security Council was changed in any way, shape, or form was in 1965, when the body grew its non-permanent membership (elected every two years) from six to 10. In 2005, then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a report called In Larger Freedom that offered two paths toward Security Council reform, one of which would add six permanent members (two from Africa, two from Asia, one from Europe, and one from Latin America) with no veto power. In November 2020, the U.N. General Assembly president at the time called reform "an unavoidable imperative, both challenging and essential."

The 900-pound elephant in the room is that none of these proposals have gained enough traction to become viable. The U.N. isn't an elementary school field day. It doesn't hand out medals for participation. Aspirations aside, the blunt reality is that the U.N. itself is the biggest impediment to U.N. reform. The U.N. Charter makes it virtually impossible for any Security Council reform effort to succeed beyond cosmetic changes. And changing the Security Council's structure and composition is certainly not a cosmetic reform.

Modifications to the Security Council would require an amendment to the U.N. Charter. The approval of two-thirds of the U.N. General Assembly and nine members of the Security Council is required just to begin a discussion. Assuming that bar is cleared, amendments need to win the support of two-thirds of U.N. members and all the Security Council's permanent members. The U.S. Senate would also need to ratify any changes to the U.N. Charter.

The first step, winning majority U.N. General Assembly support, is doable for the simple reason that developing nations hold significant influence. Winning unanimous support from the Security Council's permanent members, though, is another matter entirely. This is where any initiative would come to die. Notwithstanding the jovial talk about an international community of nations looking out for the common good, the Security Council at its core is an arena where self-interest tends to dominate. Permanent members, the U.S. included, are more than happy to leverage their veto power to kill any draft resolution they view as contrary to their own interests. We have seen it play out repeatedly, whether it's Russia's veto of multiple resolutions sanctioning the Syrian government for war crimes, China stonewalling of additional sanctions against North Korea, or the U.S. blocking resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

It's difficult to envision Security Council reform being any different. While the U.S. has views on which countries should be granted permanent membership, others may not agree with those choices. China is highly unlikely to support India's inclusion when Beijing increasingly sees the South Asian power as a regional rival (and one getting cozier with the U.S. in the process). The same goes for Japan's bid. Russia probably won't support any country the U.S. supports, if for no other reason to throw cold water on a U.S. project at a time when Washington remains Ukraine's largest arms supplier by far. While France supports Security Council enlargement in theory, it's also possible Paris would view it as a distraction from its push to alter how the veto is exercised.

The odds of the Biden administration's effort succeeding lies somewhere between slim to none. Why, then, is the White House attempting it?

Part of the reason is undoubtedly self-inflected pressure. After all, Biden broached U.N. reform himself last September, so it would look bad if the U.S. didn't at least go through the motions of putting a proposal on the table. Another reason may be China, which fancies itself as a leader of the so-called Global South, speaking out forcefully for the rights of the disenfranchised. With this pending proposal, nobody can accuse the U.S. of being disinterested.

Regardless of the reason, seasoned U.N. experts have taken notice. "I give credit to the Biden administration for at least recognizing that the current set-up of the Security Council is unsustainable," Richard Gowan, the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group, told me. The question is whether U.N. members view the U.S. drive as serious. "It has never been 100 percent clear if the U.S. thinks reform is possible, or if this is really just a ruse to annoy China," Gowan said.

Until there is clarification, other states are likely to hold their cards close to the chest.

Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.