How Belarus' Military Strength Could Impact Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Vladimir Putin's visit to his counterpart and ally Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on Monday raised concerns over Belarus being further dragged into Russia's war in Ukraine.

But what difference would Belarus' military strength make into the battleground were to intervene, and could this really tip the scale in favor of the Russian troops?

British former military officer Frank Ledwidge thinks it unlikely that Putin is after the direct involvement of Belarusian troops in Ukraine. The Belarusian army—especially in terms of troops that could be immediately involved in maneuver operations—is quite limited compared to that of Russia's, he told Newsweek.

"Belarus has very limited regular forces. If you take into account Russian casualties, even over the last three months alone, that probably exceeds the entire strength of the Belarusian army," he said. "So even if no other factor is taken into account, they are not going to be significant."

"Belarus is a relatively small country with a population of 9.44 million. Its armed forces are relatively small, especially when considering active personnel, which amounts to 45,000," Marina Miron, from the Defence Studies Department of King's College London, told Newsweek.

"Perhaps surprising for Belarus is its number of military reserves, namely 290,000. Belarus also has conscription for those aged 18 to 27. The duration of conscription can be up to 18 months, depending on academic qualification.

"However, it should be borne in mind that Belarus does not have any modern military equipment, as it has old Soviet prototypes. All in all, it is not a country that could be described as a great military might," she continued.

"If we recall, Russia's partial mobilization amounted to some 300,000 personnel, which is more than six times greater than the number of Belarus' active personnel."

On the other hand, Belarusian troops, though limited in number, could easily be integrated into a Russian formation, Ledwidge said, a move that would "produce some capability."

What Putin might be after—and what is a far more significant asset for Belarus' miitary—is the country's material reserves, "and, to a lesser extent, the Air Force," Ledwidge said.

"There are several hundred tanks, about 500 tanks in storage and lots of artillery pieces that could potentially be leased to Russia," Ledwidge said. "They're not modern tanks, they're from the 1980s and 1990s. But they have some utility."

On top of that, Belarus' Air Force has "two squadrons of B-29s and some attack aircraft, which both supplement the Russians very much," according to the former military officer.

Belarus' Involvement Is 'Unlikely'

Despite the close—though often begrudged—alliance between Lukashenko and Putin, which has allowed the Belarusian leader to keep his 28-year grip on power after mass protests in August 2020 over his victory in a contested election, a majority of the population strongly opposes the Moscow-ordered invasion of Ukraine.

This factor alone, Ledwidge said, would discourage Lukashenko from ordering its troops on the battleground in Ukraine.

"Any war is political. The real constraint on the deployment of Belarus armed forces is not their relative lack of strength," Ledwidge said.

"I think most commentators would say that, against the background of the 2020-2021 protests in Belarus, a direct involvement of Belarusian forces in the war would be almost suicidal for the regime, since the great majority of people would not support that. They have such close links with Ukraine, for a start."

Lukashenko announced on December 13 that its army was assessing its combat readiness, but military experts—including the Washington-based think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW)—think it's "unlikely" that Belarusian troops will be sent to Ukraine.

"Belarusian forces remain extremely unlikely to invade Ukraine without a Russian strike force," wrote the ISW in a report on December 16.

"It is far from clear that Lukashenko would commit Belarusian forces to fight in Ukraine even alongside Russian troops. There are still no indicators that Russian forces are forming a strike force in Belarus."

What Is More Likely To Happen?

Belarus, under the leadership of strongman Lukashenko, initially provided a launching pad for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, allowing Russian troops to reach Kyiv through the fastest route across its southern border.

Ukraine has repeatedly warned that something similar might happen again soon. Kyiv is worried Minsk might allow Moscow troops to prepare a new offensive on the Ukrainian capital from its grounds, attacking from Ukraine's northern border.

"If Belarus were to join, the most important thing it could bring to the table is a 'launch platform' to conduct offensive operations," Miron said.

"It is plausible to believe that Belarus military personnel is not equipped, experienced, and motivated enough to enter the conflict. For Russia, Belarus offers the possibility to station and train its troops and solve logistical problems. So, Belarus's dependence on Russia and her geographic location make her an attractive ally."

Ledwidge thinks a similar scenario is likely—or that at least that's what Moscow wants Kyiv to believe. "My own view, and I think the view of many experts, is that the purpose of saber-rattling from Belarus is what's called 'fixing' Ukrainian forces in the north," he said.

"That means the Ukrainians have to deploy considerable numbers of troops to deter or as a contingency against a Belarusian attack from the north."

Ukrainian troops would have to refocus their troops to the northern border to fence off a Russian attack from within Belarus, diverting them from the active fronts in the east and south of the country.

Though Belarus wouldn't be contributing with its combat capability, letting Russian troops attack Kyiv from within its border would be a significant show of support for Moscow, and another big concession to Putin.

"Taking drastic steps such as initiating mobilization and potentially deploying troops to Ukraine would create a risk to Lukashenko's rule," said Miron.

"So, while many factors might point towards involvement which should not be entirely excluded, it may be done to create uncertainty in the minds of Ukrainian military leadership as far as the location of the major offensive is concerned and to divert Ukrainians' attention away from the Donbas."

The ISW wrote that "a Russian invasion of northern Ukraine from Belarus is not very likely imminent" and remains "unlikely" at this time, though there are signs that Moscow might be preparing such a counteroffensive.

The two leaders—Putin and Lukashenko—have been rather vague about the topics discussed during their meeting on Monday. According to Putin, the two talked about forming a "unified defense space," as well as the training of the crews of Belarusian warplanes that already have been modified to make them nuclear-capable.

The Russian president said the latter was a proposal by Lukashenko, which he supported.

According to the ISW, Lukashenko confirmed that Russia "gave" Belarus an unspecified number of S-400 air defense systems that will likely be operated by Russian forces in Belarus.

"Lukashenko is likely delaying acceding to Putin's larger demands—such as committing Belarusian forces to join the invasion against Ukraine—by making smaller concessions that he has stonewalled for years," the ISW wrote on a report on December 20.