Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are wondering about the longevity of U.S. support to Ukraine. The Biden administration insists Washington will assist Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's government for as long as it takes to either drive Russian forces out of Ukraine or maximize Kyiv's leverage when the time comes for a negotiated settlement to the war. But comments from House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, who will likely become speaker of the House if Republicans win back control of the lower chamber in the midterm elections, have ruffled feathers in the Beltway and led some to wonder whether current levels of U.S. support to the Ukrainians will drop off.
European officials are pondering the same thing. Politicians like British lawmaker Tobias Ellwood, the chair of the defense committee in the House of Commons, went so far as to state that any sign of the U.S. pulling back on its assistance would be a license for Russian President Vladimir Putin to run roughshod over the Ukrainians at a time when Kyiv holds the upper hand on the battlefield. Or, as Ellwood told The Washington Post this week, "If America pulls back, Putin could snatch victory from the jaws of defeat."
Of course, Ellwood has little influence, let alone a say, over U.S. foreign policy decisions. His comments, while impolitic, are actually a reflection of what many in elite European policy circles think: If Washington doesn't hold the line, then the West at-large will eventually grow tired of the war.
But in making the point, its advocates are essentially conceding that the United States serves as the heart, lungs, brain, and spine of the coalition. Europe, to stretch the analogy even further, is playing the role of the appendix, an organ of low consequence. That in itself is a massive problem given the equities at stake and the fact that the war is, in fact, occurring in Europe.
U.S. support isn't the issue. The bigger part of the story is Europe's inability or unwillingness to match it with sufficient support of its own.
The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a think tank in Germany, has tabulated the numbers throughout the duration of the war. The main findings are eye-watering and demonstrate a funding discrepancy you could drive a tank through. At more than €52 billion (and counting), the U.S. is close to doubling the contributions of all European Union (EU) institutions and the 27 EU member states combined. When one looks specifically at military aid, the numbers are even more lopsided. Between Jan. 24 and Oct. 3, Washington committed €27.6 billion in security aid, whether it included drawdowns from Pentagon weapons stocks or financing for the manufacturing of military equipment. The next highest country on the list, the United Kingdom, stood at a grand total of €3.8 billion. Germany, Europe's largest economy (and the fourth largest in the world) registered a measly €1.2 billion in military aid, a stinginess the Ukrainians are loath to forget. Viewed another way: Washington announced as much military aid to Ukraine on a single day in September as Berlin has announced over the last eight months.
To be fair, the EU has done better in other categories. More than €12 billion have been allocated to underwrite Ukraine's budget, which is obviously suffering mightily due to the war. The EU Commission is also working on a 2023 financial package that would provide Kyiv with €1.5 billion a month, every month, for the entirety of the year. This is all well and good if the EU showed some urgency at delivering the aid already approved, but there isn't much urgency on offer. Getting Brussels to execute has been like pulling teeth. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is frustrated with her European colleagues about the slow pace of aid deliveries, using multiple opportunities to hammer home the theme. Ukrainian officials are perplexed as to why EU institutions are taking so long to make good on their commitments.
You don't have to be a Harvard economist to comprehend why the Ukrainians are miffed. Ukraine's economic problems will get worse before they get any better. The International Monetary Fund reported that Kyiv's external financing needs could be as high as $5 billion per month next year. The World Bank projected Ukraine's GDP will contract by 35 percent before the year ends. Inflation could rise to 30 percent by the end of the year, debt is skyrocketing, and a growing share of tax revenues is being diverted to the war effort. Russia's systematic targeting of Ukraine's power sources will likely continue (Russia's new commanding general, Sergei Surovikin, used the same harsh tactics when he led Russian forces in Syria), forcing the Ukrainian government to figure out a way to patch up infrastructure and keep citizens from freezing as winter approaches.
For European and U.S. policymakers, Ukraine's financial catastrophe is almost as horrifying as Russia's war strategy. But to date, Washington has been doing the vast majority of the work, writing most of the checks and absorbing most of the cost. This isn't a sustainable arrangement.
By virtue of geography, what happens in Ukraine is ultimately more important and consequential to Europe's core security than it is to America's. One must ask: When, if ever, will Europe's policy elites start acting like it?
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune and Newsweek.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
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Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.
