India Offers a Bridge to the Global South | Opinion

Since taking office in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has shown increasing ambition to strengthen India's global diplomacy and governance. In several international conferences led by India, Modi has consistently emphasized India's desire to engage in dialogue with major powers such as the United States and Europe, as well as its intention to lead developing countries. India will hold the presidency of the G20 in September 2023, which will strengthen its position as the leader of the "Global South" and amplify the voice of southern countries in the global order. It will also serve as a bridge between democratic developing countries.

For many decades since its independence in 1948, India has largely pursued a foreign policy of non-alignment, proposed by its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1954. It emphasizes India's commitment to an independent foreign policy and seeks to avoid entanglements with any power bloc. During the Cold War, India initiated the Non-Aligned Movement and saw itself as the leader of developing countries. Many southern countries participated in the movement.

The concept of the Global South is not new and lacks a clear definition. It generally refers to the large number of countries that located primarily in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America—the geographical South. The term is often used to refer to political, economic, and social "north-south" disparities. While the concept is geographically relevant, there are exceptions. For example, although Australia is geographically located in the South, it is generally considered a northern country. China, geographically more north than south, is generally considered a southern country. Notably, China and India have long competed for influence over southern countries, with both nations seeing themselves as leaders of the Global South.

From the perspective of the U.S. and Japan, which lead the democratic world's Indo-Pacific strategies, the U.S. should promote India's position as the true leader of the "Global South" in order to limit China's influence.

In recent years, India's diplomacy has increasingly focused on strengthening its relations with Western countries such as the United States and Japan, a trend that has become more pronounced under the Modi government. As the world's largest democracy, India is seen by European and American countries as an important like-minded partner, in contrast to China.

This is reflected in the "Indo-Pacific strategies" of major Western powers such as the U.S., Europe, and Japan, which plan to include India. In 2012, for example, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed the concept of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ("Quad"), linking Japan with the U.S., Australia, and India. In 2016, he further proposed the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). The U.S. subsequently expanded this concept under its own Indo-Pacific Strategy, supporting India's growing participation and influence in global affairs. The Quad mechanism, led by the U.S. and India, was established, as was the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.

Regarding relations with China, India's position is more aligned with the West. This alignment is not only due to the ongoing border disputes between China and India, but also because the two ideological rivals will compete fiercely for regional dominance in the coming decades. So far, India has not joined China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and has used Sri Lanka's ongoing financial crisis as a cautionary tale to warn southern countries about the dangers of falling into a debt trap. In 2019, India withdrew from negotiations to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership which is seen as led by China. Amid the U.S.–China rivalry, cooperation between India and Japan has gained increasing attention and significance for its impact on the Asian regional order.

India has also strengthened its cooperation with the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized nations. India attended the G7 Summit in Japan this year and has been actively playing the role of a bridge between the Global South and the camp of developed democratic countries.

However, in the context of U.S.–China and EU–Russia confrontations, India has strengthened its relations with Western countries while maintaining a certain degree of autonomy. It has not fully aligned itself with the positions of Western countries, particularly regarding the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. India has not condemned Russia's aggressive actions and did not join Western countries in imposing sanctions on Russia. India has abstained from voting on several UN resolutions condemning Russia.

In fact, India continues to maintain relatively cordial relations with Russia. Despite the energy sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, India has purchased a significant amount of oil from Russia to ensure its energy supply and maintain a balance between Russia and China, especially given their military alliance. Given India's strategic position and economic strength in the Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States and other Western countries have shown relative tolerance for India's actions in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

While concerns have been raised about the quality of Indian democracy as well as the potential negative impact of India's leadership in the Global South on unifying the world's democracies, due to India's morally neutral stance in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the real problem would arise if other countries such as China were to dominate the Global South. India's indispensable role in Indo-Pacific affairs as the world's most populous democracy, albeit flawed, along with its potential influence on the democratic values of developing countries, should lead the United States and G7 countries to adopt clear policies to help India become a true ally as leader of the Global South.

Jianli Yang is founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and the author of Its Time for a Values-Based "Economic NATO".

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.