Putin was Never Under Attack—It was All a Misunderstanding: Expert

Most of the news accounts of recent events in Russia have described Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group, as having mounted a "failed rebellion," implying that he recklessly and repeatedly put his life at risk.

Things look very different to those of us in the cyber-security community who have been following the actions of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group since its founding in 2014. It is likely that Prigozhin thought he was loyally defending Vladimir Putin at every juncture, even when marching on Moscow. What's more, it is likely that Prigozhin thought his life was already at risk and was taking steps to save it.

The biggest problem with many popular accounts is that they require one to believe that Prigozhin was essentially suicidal. They also do not explain the abrupt changes in course by both Putin and Prigozhin, such as Prigozhin's sudden decision to march on Moscow and Putin's sudden switch from denouncing Prigozhin to granting him amnesty. Most of the puzzling features in these accounts can be resolved by two key insights. One is that the Wagner Group was actually Putin's personal military force. The other is that this wasn't a two-player game, between Putin and Prigozhin. It was a four-player game—including Russia's senior military commanders and the mid-level commanders responsible for defending Moscow.

Because the Wagner Group was initially most active in cyberspace, those of us who monitor that space have had several years to observe how closely the Wagner Group's actions have been directed by Putin and the kinds of choices Prigozhin makes. Here is a more plausible account of what happened and the motives involved.

Putin had Prigozhin create the Wagner Group because Putin needed a powerful cyber and military force that he could control directly. He gave the group extraordinary powers, such as the ability to create large troll farms and to recruit directly from prisons. Putin didn't trust the senior military commanders. If they were to attempt a coup, the plan was probably for the Wagner Group to march on Moscow and rescue him. By operating outside the normal military command structure, the Wagner Group could act more rapidly and efficiently than the regular Russian military and, under Prigozhin's ruthless supervision, were less subject to corruption. Unlike the regular military, the capabilities the Wagner Group claimed to have were real, operable capabilities.

When the invasion of Ukraine started going badly, Putin deployed the Wagner Group there, because they were the only military force he could count on. The Wagner Group had already done covert work in Ukraine and had some experience with Information Age warfare. Prigozhin lived up to Putin's expectations, becoming the only Russian commander in Ukraine who could claim notable successes.

The success Prigozhin was having in a traditional military domain made him a threat to the highest levels of the traditional military command structure. The senior generals were probably afraid Putin would fire them and put Prigozhin in charge of the entire Ukraine war effort. They decided to stop Prigozhin by depriving his forces of supplies and, ultimately, eliminating him.

Prigozhin went public with his criticisms of the senior military commanders, calling them out by name, so that it would be harder for them to kill him. He wasn't trying to do something risky; he was trying to make himself less at risk. But now that they had been publicly challenged, the senior military commanders started attacking and undermining the Wagner Group, using every possible means, including, according to Prigozhin, firing on his troops.

Prigozhin expected Putin to tell the senior military commanders to back off. When this didn't happen, he thought it was because the senior commanders were feeding Putin false information and said so publicly. Prigozhin's statements that Putin wasn't to blame for the military blunders were not a result of Prigozhin being afraid to blame Putin. They were what Prigozhin actually believed.

When the senior military commanders set about removing and dismantling the Wagner Group, Prigozhin concluded that they had essentially made Putin their captive. If he didn't do something more bold and decisive, Prigozhin saw that he would be destroyed. He decided to put into effect the plan he was supposed to carry out in the event of a military coup. This was a march on Moscow. Once there, his forces would remove the senior military commanders and free Putin from their control.

Prigozhin knew that the mid-level military commanders responsible for the defense of Moscow, as well as the soldiers under their command, hated the senior military commanders. He expected those forces to come to his aid or, at least, refuse to attack his men. Prigozhin believed he could restore responsible leadership in Moscow with a minimum of bloodshed.

Putin, misinterpreting Prigozhin's march on Moscow, was shocked. He decided Prigozhin was out of control. The paranoid mentality that caused Putin to fear his senior military would betray him now led him to believe Prigozhin was betraying him. This caused Putin to denounce Prigozhin and to order the mid-level commanders to prepare for the military defense of Moscow.

Now it was Prigozhin's turn to be surprised. He had always served Putin loyally and successfully. Why was Putin denouncing him? Didn't Putin understand that Prigozhin was continuing to act in Putin's best interests? Having Putin turn against him must have been terribly demoralizing.

Meanwhile, the mid-level commanders responsible for defending Moscow were now in a terrible predicament. Their forces had been depleted by the war in Ukraine. They were faced with the prospect of having to fight 25,000 battle-hardened troops. Trying to defend Moscow against this attacking force would cause terrible losses—and even then, there was a serious chance they would lose. Although Prigozhin was correct in assuming the mid-level commanders felt no loyalty to the senior commanders directing the war in Ukraine, they were not willing to desert to Prigozhin.

Realizing he wasn't getting the support he expected, Prigozhin was ready to do a deal. The commanders of the traditional military forces in and around Moscow were willing to do a deal. Because Prigozhin's forces were encountering almost no resistance and were even being welcomed by ordinary citizens, they probably found it easy to open lines of communication with the Moscow commanders. There was a good chance that an agreement could be made that would avoid turning Moscow into a battle zone with catastrophic losses to both sides and to the city itself. Those making an agreement to save Moscow would be hailed as heroes by Moscow's citizens.

Putin needed to prevent a deal that would have bypassed and possibly deposed him. Therefore, he decided to do a deal himself. This was extremely awkward, because he had just given a speech designed to rally Russia against Prigozhin's attacking force. Since Putin had portrayed the Wagner Group as enemies of Russia, he also needed to obscure his own close relationship with them. This was probably why he employed Belarus in negotiating the deal.

Now that the immediate threat is over, Putin is probably aware that Prigozhin never intended to turn against him. But the nature of Putin's relationship to Prigozhin and the Wagner Group is not something Putin can ever acknowledge. It would make him appear, at best, foolish, at worse, dangerously irresponsible. Instead, Putin needs to denounce what had formerly been his private army and make a show of suppressing it.

One result of these events is that none of the major players remains in a secure or stable position—not Putin, not the senior military commanders, not Prigozhin, not even the mid-level Moscow commanders. Another result is the elimination of the Wagner Group as an instrument of power. Putin has lost his private army and, with it, a great deal of personal security

It might seem that the winners are the senior military commanders, who put these events in motion by their moves against Prigozhin. But Putin must now realize that they are the ones to blame (apart from Putin himself). His likely next move will be to eliminate these other players, as soon as he is in position to do so. The moves the other players make in an effort to prevent this will be interesting.

Scott Borg, the Director of the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, is an expert on the economics of cyber attacks and their strategic implications. He has commented regularly on strategic developments affecting Eastern Europe since writing, with John Bumgarner, the definitive classified account of Russia's 2008 cyber campaign against Georgia and its public summary.