How Russia Won the Nuclear Arms Race Against the U.S.

Newsweek published this story under the headline of "The Russian Bear Redux?" on January 10, 1977. In light of recent events, Newsweek is republishing the story.

Nearly twenty years ago, a panel of prominent scientists and businessmen startled the Eisenhower Administration by warning that it was not doing enough to protect the U.S. against Soviet nuclear attack. The top-secret "Gaither Report",* delivered only a month after the launching of the first sputnik, led to a massive increase in U.S. military spending and contributed to John F. Kennedy's talk in 1960 of a "missile gap." The Soviet arsenal was indeed expanding, but only after taking office did JFK conclude that the U.S. had never been in danger of losing its military superiority.

* Named for the committee's leader, Ford Foundation chairman H. Rowan Gaither Jr.

Last week, another panel of distinguished private citizens presented the incoming Carter Administration with the makings of a new missile-gap controversy. The group of relatively hard-line outsiders, led by Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes, had been invited last summer to join for the first time in preparing the annual national intelligence estimate of Soviet strategic intentions. The result: the most alarming forecast in years.

Previous estimates said the Soviet Union was aiming for military parity with the United <states. this="" time=""> Superiority: The panel's conclusions were not based on any dramatic intelligence breakthroughs. Instead, they were a reinterpretation of existing evidence. The seven outside experts charged that the Central Intelligence Agency was not taking a serious enough view of Soviet military expansion. They cited improvements in missiles, expansion of Russia's underground shelters and a continuing improvement of its low-level air defenses as unmistakable evidence, in the words of one outsider, that "the Soviets want strategic superiority." Then the consultants argued their case with CIA analysts. "That sobered up everybody," said one outside expert. "The CIA draft of its national intelligence estimate was charged in the direction of our viewpoint."

In additional to the Pipes study of Soviet intentions, NEWSWEEK learned, two separate panels of outsiders of about ten members each dealt with specific technical questions: the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the actual effectiveness of its air defenses. They also came to some daunting conclusions. The panel on missile accuracy, for example, estimated that by the 1980s the Russians will be able to drop an ICBM within 300 feet of its target - an astonishing improvement over the quarter-mile margin for error currently credited to the Soviets (U.S. missile accuracy at present is said to be 500 feet or less).

The outsider panel was recruited because President Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board wanted a hard-line view to balance the more "relaxed" estimates of CIA analysts. The findings will now put pressure on the Carter Administration to spend more money on strategic weapons, including a new "super" ICBM and the controversial B-1 bomber. Some extreme hard-liners in the Pentagon are talking of budget increases that could add up to nearly $40 billion a year. Carter will not agree to anything like that, but even before details of the still-secret Pipes report leaked out early last week, he was backing away from his campaign promise to trim the defense budget by $5 billion to $7 billion (page 14).

The President-elect indicated last week he was not overly worried about the Soviet intentions. "I think it's apparent that their rate of growth of military strength compared to ours has probably been fairly substantial," he declared. "But we're still, by far, stronger than they are in most means of measuring strength." Carter also made it clear he prefers a second-stage SALT accord with Moscow limiting strategic weapons, rather than a massive new military spending program. He said a summit meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev - possibly in this country - was "a likely prospect for 1977, although we haven't made any plans about it yet."

Maverick: The formation of the outside panel was itself a victory for superhawks like Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., the maverick Air Force chief of intelligence (box, page 24). With the approval of CIA director George Bush, Pipes chose six colleagues: Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corp.; retired Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Paul D. Wolfowitz of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Paul H. Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; retired Air Force Gen. John Vogt; and Prof. William Van Cleave of the University of Southern California.

The outside experts concluded that the Russians are not reassured by the current nuclear standoff. "What drives the Soviets is their desire for security, but they go to extremes," said one panelist. "Americans emphasize deterrence and don't like to think about fighting a war if deterrence fails. The Russians want to be prepared in case deterrence breaks down. Thus they are taking steps to minimize their casualties in a nuclear war." The outsiders were offering no prediction, however, that the Kremlin wanted to start a war. "It intends to use its strategic nuclear weapons for political purposes to get what it wants in the world," said one.

As many CIA analysts still see it, the Russians realize that they have nothing to gain from seeking military superiority. These experts argue that the Soviet respect American power and recognize that the U.S. can hold its own in any new arms race. They also believe that the Russians are unlikely to embark on new military or diplomatic adventures. "They don't like to take high risks," one analyst argued. "They are careful about any potential collision of superpower interests." Carter's choice for Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, seems to agree. In a 1975 speech, he said it made no sense to "reach a new equilibrium in strategic arms at a higher level of military capability. Indeed, my strong preference is for a new equilibrium . . . at a lower level."

'Cardinal Task': The Kremlin itself was trying to encourage the "relaxed" fraction of U.S. analysts. In an interview with an American newspaperman last week, Brezhnev complained that "certain circles in the West" were launching "one noisy campaign after another over an allegedly growing 'military menace' from the U.S.S.R., demanding new military appropriations and stepping up the arms race." Instead, Brezhnev said he wanted a summit with Carter to pursue "the cardinal task of our time: to prevent nuclear war."

Since no U.S. analyst is capable of reading minds, there was no way of knowing what Brezhnev's real intentions were. The Pipes report, however, coincided with growing support for military spending on Capitol Hill (NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27). And whether or not the Russians really meant to bury the U.S. armed forces, Jimmy Carter was likely to encounter great difficulty in cutting the defense budget.