Ukraine's China Problem

In the eight months since Russia invaded Ukraine, China has engaged in a diplomatic balancing act of neither condemning the former nor supporting the latter. But Kyiv has been walking a tightrope of its own, tiptoeing around Beijing's red lines while courting China skeptics in the West.

President Volodymyr Zelensky sees Ukraine's future in the transatlantic family of democracies, but for a country that has lodged itself in the Western camp—ideologically, if not yet institutionally—its response to China's position on the conflict has been deliberately cautious.

In the weeks leading up to February 24, Chinese officials disparaged U.S. and allied intelligence about a potential full-scale invasion. After the war began, Beijing was forced onto the defensive to deny knowledge of Moscow's plans and reject suggestions it would in any way aid Russia's military campaign.

China argues it's not a party to the conflict and dismisses Western and Ukrainian presumptions about any influence it could exert over the Russian leadership.

But its outwardly neutral stance is limited only to its diplomatic institutions. Beijing's propaganda organs, especially those on the home front, are directed heavily in the Kremlin's favor to sympathize with Moscow's security concerns, recycle Russian disinformation, and blame American hegemony for the war.

Ukraine, notably, has had little to say on the matter. Leaders in Washington and Brussels have remarked on the duplicity of Beijing's rhetoric in favor of key United Nations tenets—sovereignty and territorial integrity—while it refuses to publicly censure Moscow for clear violations.

Kyiv, on the other hand, has worked to avoid upsetting one of its most important economic relationships, accounting for some 15 percent of Ukrainian exports since 2019. Officials also believe that keeping China on side could prevent further Russian escalation on the battlefield.

Zelensky himself has led the careful diplomatic approach. His already infrequent comments on China haven't been nearly as blunt as the sharp reprimands he has reserved for indecisive European counterparts.

One of his economic advisers, who spoke on condition of anonymity as they weren't authorized to discuss the matter publicly, said Kyiv was still open to cooperation with Beijing.

"We need to keep an open door to China," the adviser told Newsweek, noting that Ukraine's president has said as much since he was elected in 2019. Last year, for example, Zelensky went against the increasingly China-skeptic tide in the U.S. when he said he didn't consider Beijing a geopolitical threat.

Kyiv has two priorities, the adviser said: "To help us push Russia and to create partnerships."

"China, for us, is a very reliable trade partner," they said. "Of course, we're trying to establish a new relationship between our leaders."

"Today, we know it will be horrible if China starts to provide ammunition for Russian forces, but we don't believe this is possible," the adviser said, suggesting Beijing wouldn't want to be tied too closely to Putin's protracted war.

Beijing has maintained a positive image in policymaking circles in Kyiv over the years. Traditionally, bilateral trade and the partnership on military technology have been the core of Ukraine-China ties, said political analyst Yurii Poita, who heads the Asia section at the Kyiv-based New Geopolitics Research Network.

"For a long period of time, Ukraine perceived China as a window of opportunity to develop its economy by increasing trade turnover and investment flow," Poita told Newsweek. "China was also considered a possible security cushion to counterbalance Russia."

The Ukrainian government's overall assessment of the relationship hasn't changed much, according to Poita, even if harsh realities have somewhat tempered the initial optimism: China enjoys a three-to-one trade surplus over Ukrainian exports of mostly agricultural products and raw material, while Chinese capital accounts for 1 percent of foreign investment in Ukraine.

Silence in Beijing

To be sure, Ukraine has gained little in return for its discretion on China. In the past months, public statements out of Kyiv have revealed less certainty in Beijing's willingness to actively help stop the war.

Zelensky's public musings are easier to track, in part because they're so rare. From early suggestions that Beijing might pressure the Kremlin to wind down its invasion, which continues to threaten food and energy security, his remarks began to reflect a sense of resignation that Kyiv wouldn't be receiving any public backing from its "strategic partner."

Top of Ukraine's complaints, however, is Beijing's apparent refusal to arrange high-level talks between Zelensky and his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping. Ukraine and China marked three decades of formal diplomatic relations in 2022, but the two leaders haven't spoken for over a year.

At a Chatham House press event in March, Andriy Yermak, head of Zelensky's office, heaped praise on China's global influence, before declaring that Kyiv expected dialogue between the two presidents to "take place very soon." The call never materialized.

In a September interview with French paper Ouest-France, Zelensky was pessimistic about the prospect of talks with Xi. "This is a shame. I would like them to help Ukraine," he said.

President Vladimir Putin, by contrast, has had Xi's ear on several occasions this year, including by phone on day two of the invasion, another call in June, and an in-person meeting in Uzbekistan in September.

"China's position on the Ukraine crisis is consistent and clear. We always follow an objective and fair approach, stand for peace and will continue to play a constructive part in deescalation efforts in our own way," Wang Wenbin, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, told a press briefing in September when asked about Beijing's lack of reciprocity with Kyiv.

China's contribution to deescalation, according to official lines this year, has been to deplore Western sanctions against Russia, oppose military aid to Ukraine, and urge Washington and Brussels to negotiate a political settlement that addresses Moscow's security concerns.

Privately, senior Chinese officials have also articulated far stronger support for Russia's grievances, and Beijing remains confident in its choices.

"China's position is objective and fair, and consistent with the aspirations of most countries. Time will prove that China's position is on the right side of history," Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, told reporters in March.

Last month, 143 U.N. member states voted to condemn Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territories via "illegal so-called referendums." China was among 35 nations that abstained.

Shifting Attitudes in Kyiv

"Kyiv's views on China have evolved since the start of open aggression: from fear that China may support the Russian invasion to hopes they may deter the use of nuclear weapons," said Orysia Lutsevych, a research fellow and head of the Ukraine Forum in the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House.

"Zelensky believes that the only person who has leverage over Putin is actually Xi, and he was hoping for a phone call with the Chinese leader, which did not happen so far," Lutsevych told Newsweek.

Ukraine is doubtless aware of Beijing's strategically important relationship with Moscow—Russia is the only major power with enough political heft to buttress China's own intensifying rivalry with the West.

"China has a more anti-U.S. policy than a pro-Russia policy," said Zelensky's economic adviser, a framing that views Beijing's sensitivity to Western support for Ukraine from the perspective of U.S.-China competition.

Similarly, Beijing's opposition to the continued existence of NATO and Xi's endorsement of Putin's principle of "indivisible security" by extension question the legitimacy of U.S.-led alliances in Asia, which directly concerns China's own revanchist ambitions in its neighborhood.

But the needle is moving, said Poita, who pointed to two eye-opening instances in recent years.

The first involved Chinese company Skyrizon Aviation's 2017 purchase of large stakes in Ukrainian aerospace firm Motor Sich, creator of rocket engines for the Neptune anti-ship missile and other Ukrainian hardware. Following an intervention by the Trump administration, Zelensky scuppered the deal on national security grounds.

The second was a case of Chinese political coercion amid the COVID-19 pandemic. In June 2021, Western diplomats told the Associated Press that Beijing was successful in making Kyiv withdraw its support for a Canada-led joint statement on China's treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang at the U.N. Human Rights Council, by threatening to withhold a planned shipment of at least 500,000 Chinese vaccines.

Observers were surprised once more last month when Ukraine, after staunch backing from the West, abstained as the Human Rights Council voted narrowly against debating the U.N. Human Rights Office's latest report on Xinjiang. Kyiv sought to change its vote the following day, but the record stood.

Last week, it was given something of a do-over when it co-signed a 50-nation joint statement, again led by Canada, urging China to implement the report's recommendations, including by releasing arbitrarily detained Uyghurs.

Dai Bing, chargé d'affaires of the Chinese mission to the U.N., called the move a "malicious attack and smear" orchestrated by the U.S. and other Western countries, and an "interference in China's internal affairs under the pretext of human rights."

Oleksandr Merezhko, a member of Zelensky's Servant of the People party and chair of the foreign affairs committee in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament, said his government's skepticism of China was growing because of Beijing's deepening "no limits" partnership with Moscow.

Kyiv's support for the joint statement was "the morally right step," he told Newsweek. "Ukraine is fighting for democratic values, and we should support other democracies and counter genocide."

The longer the war goes on, the more Kyiv would "resolutely join the camp of democracies in condemning violations of human rights in China," Lutsevych said.

"In the end, it is the U.S. that is the largest contributor of military support for Ukraine, and it is democratic values that millions of Ukrainian are defending on the battlefield," she said.

Ukraine's decision to put its name to the U.N. letter may have seemed like picking low-hanging fruit, but its significance shouldn't be overlooked, according to Poita, who said it wouldn't have been an easy step for Kyiv to take, while failing to stand up for liberal democratic values could've undermined trust in Ukraine in the West.

"I hope that Ukraine has learned that the West is sacrificing serious economic interests for Ukraine, that democratic values are also import, and that it, too, should be willing to sacrifice economic interests for the sake of values including human rights," Poita said.

Red Lines and Realpolitik

If Ukraine were to gradually drift away from China, it would do so while remaining extremely conscious of China's red lines, sensitive areas of the relationship that might trigger a political backlash from Beijing, if not change dynamics on the battlefield.

Bryce Barros, an analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, believes Ukrainian interactions with counterparts in Taiwan could be one such area, especially as Rada members seek to upgrade political ties with Taipei.

China claims the democratic island as part of its territory and takes issue with any official exchanges with the Western-leaning Taiwanese government. The Chinese foreign ministry told Newsweek in June that it wouldn't oppose exchanges of an economic or cultural nature.

As is often the case in democracies, cynicism about China in Ukraine's legislature has grown much faster than in its executive branch.

Lawmakers like Merezhko see Taiwanese counterparts as like-minded and worthy of support, despite acknowledging the need to operating within Ukraine's own "one China" framework, which doesn't recognize the island's statehood.

Kira Rudik, leader of the pro-European, liberal Holos party, traveled to Taipei last month in a historic first visit by a Ukrainian member of parliament. She also met with President Tsai Ing-wen.

Here, too, Kyiv intervened out of an abundance of caution. Two Ukrainian lawmakers, who requested anonymity in order to speak candidly, said senior parliamentary and foreign ministry figures pressured a handful of Rada deputies to cancel planned trips to Taiwan, wishing to avoid tensions with Beijing.

The government position on Taiwan, one deputy said, had been "unexpectedly weak."

It would be difficult to predict Beijing's reaction to closer Ukraine-Taiwan parliamentary ties, Barros said.

"It may not be enough for Beijing to want to arm Russia, which could expose China to Western sanctions, but I could see them trying to diplomatically box out the Ukrainians the same way they had tried to do with the Lithuanians," Barros said, referring to Beijing's spat with Vilnius over the latter's decision to forge closer, though still unofficial, ties with Taipei.

"It speaks to Kyiv wanting to tread very lightly," Barros said of Ukraine's wariness. "If you're a Ukrainian policymaker, you do want to make sure that you're courting China in a way that doesn't give them excuses to lean in hard with the Russians explicitly on things like weapons."

Ukraine has red lines, too. Any material assistance from Beijing to Moscow—easier to spot than help with sanctions or providing battlefield intelligence—would top the list, said Poita.

While few know what the Ukraine-China relationship will look like when the shooting stops, early questions have emerged about China's potential role in rebuilding Ukraine.

Kyiv isn't ruling out the possibility of assistance from Beijing, Poita said, but the Rada, which could mandate investment screening, and Ukraine's Western backers, which would fund much of the reconstruction, could have some say in the level of Chinese standards to be introduced into key infrastructure such as telecommunications networks, power grids, and transportation.

In the meantime, Zelensky can afford to allow realpolitik to prevail. "Ukraine won't antagonize the dragon while fighting the bear," Poita argued. But Kyiv will eventually have to address the issue of how it defines China.

Ukraine wouldn't be expected to explicitly describe China in the standout terms of the age—competitor, challenger, or threat—but it would need to clarify its China policy going forward if it wants to win the confidence of future economic partners in the EU and security allies in NATO, lest its ambiguous posture breed uncertainty about a "Trojan horse," Poita said.

China's foreign ministry didn't return Newsweek's request to comment before publication.