U.S. Policy on the Houthis Is the Definition of Insanity | Opinion

As President Joe Biden walked toward Air Force One on Jan. 18, he was asked whether the ongoing U.S. military strikes against the Houthis were working to keep the Red Sea's shipping lanes open. "Well, when you say 'working,' are they stopping the Houthis? No. Are they going to continue? Yes," Biden said.

It was an astounding statement, if only because Biden admitted the strikes weren't having their intended effect. Why the administration believes it's wise to stick with a policy that is proving ineffective and could usher in the very regional escalation it supposedly wants to prevent, Biden didn't say. But it's nevertheless an indictment of U.S. foreign policy in general and a prime example of how U.S. policymakers are frequently guided by emotional impulse instead of cold-blooded calculation.

In Yemen in particular, the evidence over the several months is clear-cut: U.S. strikes are failing to achieve anything beyond the tactical. The U.S. has launched multiple rounds of strikes against Houthi military installations across multiple locations in Yemen, including command-and-control nodes, drone production facilities, and missile storage areas. The first operation on Jan. 11, in coordination with the United Kingdom, was by far the most extensive to date, targeting more than 70 Houthi locations in what Biden at the time stressed would degrade and deter additional Houthi attacks. Since then, the U.S. has taken aim at Houthi missile sites along the coast; on Feb. 3, U.S. and U.K. forces hit another 36 Houthi targets. A day later, the U.S. unilaterally destroyed five Houthi cruise missiles.

The Houthis, however, have demonstrated no willingness whatsoever to change their policy. The U.S. strikes are not only failing as a strategy of deterrence but also as a strategy of compellence: coercing another party to influence its decision-making in favor of accommodation. The group's bottom line stance—strikes in the Red Sea will persist as long as aid is blocked from entering Gaza—hasn't changed one iota. As if to underscore the point, Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi stated that "nothing—not all the threats, the missiles, the pressure—will change our position." While some may write these comments off as bluster, the Houthis' behavior suggests otherwise.

The question, then, is why does the Biden administration insist on continuing a policy that is falling short?

There are multiple explanations at play. First, the administration may believe that responding to Houthi drone and missile attacks with airstrikes will, over time, push the movement toward the belated conclusion that a tit-for-tat with the world's military superpower isn't in their best interest. The White House may also be aiming to degrade the Houthis' military capabilities to the point where further attacks against vessels are no longer possible.

But both assumptions are problematic. While responding to each and every Houthi missile attack may follow a certain logic in terms of proportionality, it also provides the Houthis with precisely what they seem to covet: a full-fledged war with the U.S., which would boost their bona-fides as one of the region's predominate resistance movements and allow them to draw a stark contrast with Arab-majority governments that have stuck with rhetorical condemnations against Israel. A conflict with Washington would grant the Houthis an opportunity to do what they do best—fight. For a group that has been quite unpopular during times of relative peace, the shift is a godsend.

The notion that U.S. strikes could eliminate or seriously degrade the Houthis' capacity to inflict violence is also problematic. First, as good as the U.S. intelligence community is, it doesn't have a full picture of where the Houthis store and produce their military equipment. Most U.S. resources in Yemen are focused on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, an anti-U.S. terrorist group that also views the Houthis as an enemy. Re-ordering those intelligence priorities and the resources that go along with it isn't as straightforward as flipping a switch—and given the Houthis' limited intent and capacity to attack Americans, such a re-ordering might not be wise anyway.

The Houthis also won't be standing still. They will try to replace as much of their arsenal as they possibly can, either by utilizing well-established illicit supply lines with Iran, or by creating entirely new ones. So while U.S. defense officials are confident that previous strikes succeeded in destroying their targets, the Houthis will adapt and attempt to rebuild what they lost.

Bluntly put, U.S. policy against the Houthis is the definition of insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. The Biden administration should instead listen to what the Houthis are actually demanding: greater inflows of humanitarian aid into Gaza. This ask isn't unreasonable in the grand scheme and is technically U.S. policy already. While hawks in Washington will claim that the Houthis can't be allowed to dictate the behavior of a superpower, or hold the Red Sea hostage, the reality is that this isn't the first time a non-state group has used its leverage to compel policy change—and it won't be the last.

U.S. military action every few days won't persuade the Houthis. The most effective way for Washington to end Houthi attacks on international waterways isn't through military strikes, but by spending the required diplomatic resources to end the war in Gaza as soon as possible.

Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.